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In the secondary literature on ancient China one finds a line of reasoning that, 
if persuasive, would imply that each and any approach relying on categories or 
concepts such as “rhetoric” is misconceived at best and an instance of epistemic 
violence at worst.1 Here is how the line of reasoning is frequently presented. 
First, some rather straightforward and uncontroversial statements are given. 
“Rhetoric”, it is said, is a word in the English language (just check the mighty 
Oxford English Dictionary). Then, the reader is reminded that the etymon of 
the word rhetoric is classical Latin rhetorice, harking back to Greek rhētorikḗ. In 
Greco-Roman antiquity, the reasoning continues, rhetoric was from some point 
onwards conceived of as an art (téchnē, ars), an acquired skill (ars oratoria, ars 
dicendi) or an ability (eloquentia), as everybody knows and the New Pauly surely 
confirms. In fact, the art of rhetoric was practised by orators in various social and 
institutional arenas, taught by teachers and examined by philosophers. Some 
rhetoricians acted at once as orators, teachers and philosophers, while others 
focused on one or two of the activities only. Important for the reasoning is the fact 
that these activities were central both to ancient Greece and Rome, although the 
arenas in which rhetoricians pursued them shifted throughout history with the 
changing social and institutional orders that prevailed. Up to this point, not 
much of a dispute appears to arise, since to the extent that these statements are 
true, they are certainly true enough. 
On such or similar basis it is then often concluded that rhetoric had been 
invented in ancient Greece and that it need therefore be somehow a singularly or 
1 An example somewhere in between misconception and epistemic violence is the following 
statement by Gernet on an “organicist” type of thought in 5th to 3rd century BC China: “[T]his 
thought had its own framework and themes. It was concerned with questions that, at least, until 
quite recently, attracted little or no interest in the West. So it would be fruitless to expect it to 
manifest those philosophical preoccupations which dominate the Western tradition, and unjust 
to use our own categories when analyzing it.” Vernant and Gernet 1996: 84.
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exclusively Greco-Roman category or concept. Again, no doubt, there might be 
some truth as to the claim for invention. (Yet, as it stands, in the absence of detail 
on the rhetoric that is presumed to have been invented, the conclusion might be 
true and false at the same time.) Perhaps it might even be appropriate to refer to 
rhetoric as a Greco-Roman category or concept. Yet, what to make of the claim 
of singularity or exclusivity? That claim seems to be based on an “enthymemic” 
argument, that is, an argument that involves unstated assumptions. Scrutinizing 
the assumptions will show that the claim of singularity is either unfounded or 
banal (or both) whereas the claim of exclusivity is perhaps sound, but of neces-
sity post-comparative (how else would you know that x is exclusive to a if you did 
not compare and check for x in b, c, etc.).2 If the post-comparative claim of exclu-
sivity hence comes to be used – bringing the line of reasoning to its desired con-
clusion – in order to show that a comparative approach to rhetoric beyond an-
cient Greece and Rome is misconceived or an instance of epistemic violence, then 
one ends up in a contradiction: if exclusivity is a result of comparison, then this 
sufficiently proves the conduciveness to fruitful comparison of the category or 
concept claimed to be exclusive. The exclusivity cannot possibly come to stand in 
the way of comparison. Brought to such a conclusion, the line of reasoning evi-
dently fails to be persuasive.
So, if comparative approaches to rhetoric in ancient China are not frustrated 
due to Greco-Roman singularity or exclusivity of the category or concept of rheto-
ric, what then can be said about the possibilities and limits of such approaches? 
For posing this question in a meaningful way, let alone answering it, it is impera-
tive to lay out as clearly as possible some few fundamentals about comparison 
itself and to give a short discussion about what the concept of rhetoric might 
amount to in a comparative framework as well as about what it cannot possibly 
amount to. In any case, this is how the following comments are structured.
1 Some fundamentals about comparison
A comparison of something with itself seems futile if that something is truly 
identical in all possible aspects. Comparison hence always involves two or more 
comparanda, which are put one next to the other in view of an aspect that is pre-
sumed to be common to both comparanda, the so-called tertium comparationis. 
If, for example, ancient Greece and ancient China are chosen for comparison in 
2 The claim for invention is no less post-comparative; it amounts to a sort of exclusivity at a 
given time.
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view of their rhetoric, then ancient Greece and ancient China each comes to serve 
as a comparandum and rhetoric as a tertium comparationis. That there is rhetoric 
to be compared here and there which is in some sense the same rhetoric is pre-
sumed by such a comparative framework. The framework presumes also other 
commonalities between the comparanda, which, clustered together, I call the pre- 
comparative tertium, such as the common description or qualification of Greece 
and China in terms of both being ancient and possibly some common background 
against which a distinction between Greece on the one side and China on the 
other is drawn (e.g. Greece and China as “civilizations”, as “cultures”, as “lan-
guage communities”, etc.). The distinction between pre-comparative tertium and 
the tertium comparationis is a matter of emphasis mainly, to be sure, as each 
refers to commonalities describing or qualifying the comparanda. But the former 
refers to commonalities that are not explicitly or not primarily put up for compar-
ison, whereas the latter specifies the common aspects at the centre of the compar-
ative inquiry. The distinction, however, is useful precisely because comparison is 
to be understood as part of an inquiry. 
To inquire into something means to acknowledge that there is something not 
yet known, something perhaps only presumed but not yet confirmed, or some-
thing vague to be clarified. Inquiries might be motivated by different concerns. 
The inquiry that makes use of comparison might concern only one of the com-
paranda involved in the comparison, or it might equally concern all of them, or 
aim at something that is quintessentially beyond them (which would make the 
use of comparison purely instrumental). Sometimes it is suggested – along a vari-
ant of the above mentioned line of reasoning – that overfamiliarity with one com-
parandum and large-scale ignorance of the other might frustrate a comparative 
inquiry and, for example, force a set of tertia comparationis on the less familiar 
comparandum that is unduly or overtly drawn from the more familiar comparan-
dum. It seems, however, that when faced with something unfamiliar or unknown, 
it is often at once most natural and effective to compare it with something that is 
presumably familiar or known and, at first glance at least, somehow considered 
to be similar. In just any case, if comparison is understood as part of an inquiry, 
then there is some pre-comparative vagueness informing the purpose of the in-
quiry. In the course of inquiry that vagueness will undergo change together with 
the comparanda that presumably are coming to be better known (by themselves 
but also relationally, i.e. one in view of the other). 
When comparing, in other words, comparanda (that which is to be compared) 
are transformed into comparata (that which has been compared). What has 
served as pre-comparative tertium might, by dint of comparison, prove no longer 
to be considered a commonality of the comparata. In the process, new tertia 
comparationis might become relevant, standing in a complicated relation to 
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the initial pre-comparative tertium. At the end of the comparison, the pre- 
comparative vagueness might have been removed or simply have given way to a 
post-comparative vagueness that might in turn serve as a basis for a new compar-
ative inquiry. The distinctions drawn help formulate some limits of comparison, 
which I have elsewhere described as follows: “[…] the resulting comparata are 
still in some important sense the same as the initial comparanda. In some sense, 
but not in another; for they are the same and they are different. Would they not be 
the same in any sense, but just be different, then the comparison would not have 
been about what it was supposed (and perhaps announced) to be about. Would 
they be just the same and no different, then no inquiry and no comparison would 
have taken place.”3 In more ways than I can mention here, the fundamental phil-
osophical puzzle underlying all comparison is how anything (or any two things) 
can be the same but different.
Above, I have claimed that some same rhetoric to be compared here and there 
is presumed by a comparison of rhetoric between ancient Greece and ancient 
China. This might seem blatantly wrong and requires explanation. Obviously, the 
result of a comparison of rhetoric might exactly be that there is rhetoric in ancient 
Greece, but no rhetoric in ancient China. The New Pauly, for example, comes 
close to such a finding when stating: “It is true that some forms of rhetoric can 
also be found outside European culture, but they tend not to achieve the same 
degree of elaboration that is a hallmark of Greco-Roman antiquity.”4 Having only 
forms of rhetoric, they seem decidedly not to boast the real thing. Such a finding 
(however Eurocentric it might strike the reader to be) is theoretically entirely pos-
sible. Whereas one kind of asserted difference that comparison may yield relates 
to a tertium comparationis by claiming one form of it here and another form there, 
another kind of asserted difference relates to a tertium comparationis by claiming 
it only here but not there (the New Pauly of course proves that “form” may also be 
used deceptively to mean “not there”). For an obvious example of the latter kind 
of asserted difference, consider comparing two cities and their public transport 
systems, in which case it would be entirely reasonable to reach the conclusion 
that one city has a subway whereas the other has none, the tertium comparationis 
being “having a subway”. 
This point, finally, is to acknowledge the fundamentality of the person doing 
the comparison, for a comparison is always done by someone, standing between 
the comparanda, conceiving of the pre-comparative tertium in one way or an-
other, and choosing which commonalities to put up for comparison at the centre 
3 Weber 2015 (forthcoming).
4 Walde 2006. 
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of the inquiry. It should, however, not go unnoticed that the city that turned out 
not to have a subway could have had one. This is why the person comparing the 
public transport systems of the two cities was making use of the tertium compa- 
rationis in the first place. That it could have had a subway is an important pre-
sumption brought to the comparison from the side of the comparing person, and 
it is a presumption that must stand its ground (e.g. under the scrutiny of peers or 
the public) if the comparison is to be persuasive. The basic relatability of the ter-
tium comparationis to a comparandum demarcates a limit of comparison that 
makes comparisons appear scandalous where it seems impossible to argue for 
such a relatability (as, say, in a comparison between a crocodile and the number 
two for their digestibility after having been eaten). It is in this sense that a com-
parison between ancient Greece and ancient China must presume some same 
rhetoric to be compared here and there. It must be presumed that the result of the 
comparison for rhetoric could possibly be that there is rhetoric here and there, 
even if it is the contrary that emerges from the comparison. 
The person doing the comparison is also crucial with regard to the point of 
(over-)familiarity, for obviously it is to somebody that the one comparandum is or 
appears more familiar than the other. I have already remarked that familiarity is 
a double-edged sword, possibly facilitating or hindering comparison. If the point 
of familiarity is combined with the claim of exclusivity, as when “Western” com-
parers are charged for using “Greco-Roman” categories or concepts, a series of 
issues emerge. One is theoretical, since the familiarity undermines the exclusivity 
unless “Western” comparers are somehow claimed not only to be familiar with, 
but active users of the exclusive “Greco-Roman” categories and concepts. The ex-
clusivity would have to extend to cover not only ancient Greece and Rome, but 
also the “modern West”. Against this kind of continuity stand, for instance, the 
repeated warnings of such distinguished scholars as Geoffrey Lloyd, who empha-
sizes the hermeneutical distance between ancient Greece and the contemporary 
world.5 Familiarity might turn out to be chimerical, after all, as there might be less 
of it around than is usually assumed. In any case, under a dynamic view of com-
parison, it would seem that the less familiar comparandum inevitably has to 
become more familiar, reducing the danger associated with overfamiliarity or the 
benefit of using what is familiar to learn about what is not familiar. It might even 
occasionally be the case that “Western” comparers are more familiar with the 
“non-Western” comparandum than their alleged “Greco-Roman” categories or 
concepts would allow them to be (since surely and without knowing they are 
operating from within that surreptitiously sedimented stock of exclusive concepts 
5 Lloyd 2004: 188. 
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and categories, that is, notwithstanding the heaps of literature and strenuous 
effort that a sinologist had to engage in to become a specialist and notwithstand-
ing the little he or she might be acquainted with any detail of the Greco-Roman 
conceptual world). 
2  What rhetoric in a comparative approach might 
and might not mean
Comparative approaches to rhetoric in ancient China might (and often do) draw 
on a tertium comparationis that is informed by some or another understanding of 
Greco-Roman rhetoric. Yet, from a contemporary and a theoretical standpoint, 
nothing particularly recommends such an approach, as there are plenty of other 
understandings of rhetoric available, so much so that scholars of Greco-Roman 
rhetoric have to be very clear that their subject-matter is different from more 
recent rhetoric, which to them cannot but appear as “deformed, by way of reduc-
tion or extension of its authentic realm [i.e. of rhetoric properly speaking].”6 
Nothing speaks against adopting an understanding of rhetoric that is informed 
by 20th century scholarship in areas as different as literature, semiotics, herme-
neutics, or philosophy. The “new rhetoric” of a Chaïm Perelman or of a Kenneth 
Burke might provide for an understanding of rhetoric that is just perfectly suited 
for a comparative approach to rhetoric in early China – even and no less than if 
the comparison happens to be with ancient Greece. 
Whatever understanding of rhetoric is employed in a comparison as tertium 
comparationis, it makes much difference whether the comparing person is aware 
of it, has reflected upon it, has made the choice transparent, and perhaps has 
bothered to give reasons for choosing so. Something similar can of course be said 
about cooperative academic endeavours on rhetoric in ancient China, which, like 
comparison, are a putting of one thing next to another (one participant’s under-
standing of rhetoric next to another’s), and are probably only successful to the 
extent that some underlying commonalities emerge more plainly to, and are re-
flected upon and clarified by, the cooperating participants. This is not to deny the 
possible value of productive misunderstanding, of talking past each other, of be-
coming aware of one’s own understanding by exposure to the different under-
standing of others, etc. But it would seem slightly disconcerting should there be 
little or no common understanding driving a cooperative endeavour worthy of the 
6 Andersen 2001: 18.
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name; at least “rhetorically”, such commonalities would as a matter of course 
often find affirmation.
The meaning of rhetoric deployed in a comparative approach might therefore 
vary with good reason and depend on factors as different as the particular aims 
and purposes attached to a comparison, disciplinary conventions and predisposi-
tions towards some pre-comparative tertium, or the availability and nature of the 
material to be examined. To give some examples: The understanding of rhetoric 
might build on a contrast with truth or rather take rhetoric as a means to articu-
late truth (and be negatively or positively connoted), or not be related to truth at 
all, say, as harmless embellishment for the sake of aesthetic pleasure. It might or 
might not be tied to the ethical project of a vir bonus, as it was for Quintilian, or be 
understood as a “natural phenomenon” shared by humans and other animals.7 It 
might hinge on aspects of rhetoric in terms of orality or textuality, focus on texts 
discussing rhetoric (as only few texts do) or on texts exhibiting the use of rhetoric 
(as arguably all texts do), or concentrate on the figure of the rhetorician, be it as 
“masters of truth” or as “masters of disguise”. With the former, of whom Marcel 
Detienne has said that each “is also a master of deception”, attention might shift 
to early democratic practices or “the workings of argued justice” as fundamen-
tally informing what rhetoric is taken to be.8 Quite a different understanding 
could be gleaned from reading a master of disguise such as Han Feizi and his 
“Shui Nan” (說難) chapter, which places persuasion and rhetoric in quite a differ-
ent political context, the one of ministers in the service of a ruler.9
Whatever rhetoric is eventually taken to mean (and not anything might work, 
that is, in the sense of being persuasive to others as a possible meaning of rheto-
ric), there is of course the danger of conceptual overstretch whereby rhetoric 
comes to mean everything, loses all analytical purchase and therefore ends up 
meaning nothing. However, there is also another danger, which is more subtle 
and omnipresent in discussions of comparative approaches. It rests on a confu-
sion of what comparison does and is intimately related to variants of the claim of 
singularity, which, I have posited, is either unfounded or banal (or both). It is 
banal if it is to claim that the sort of rhetoric that was invented and thrived in an-
cient Greece is a singular event in history that cannot be compared (in the sense 
of being likened) to anything else in history. Taken in its singularity, that is surely 
the case, since no singularity could possibly be likened to anything else without 
thereby loosening its singularity. That is what singularity means. No use of words 
can capture it; singularity is a claim that is posited to be beyond language. Saying 
7 Kennedy 1998: 4.
8 Detienne 1996: 86, 117.
9 Watson (transl.) 1964: 73–79.
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that something is singular (or unique, peerless, incomparable, sui generis) like 
something else is singular undermines its singularity. Not to be mistaken, it is an 
assertion and a presupposition that despite its banality bears considerable im-
portance, even for comparative approaches (for one wants to think of and per-
haps does well to fancy one’s comparanda /comparata as being very much singu-
lar), but it bears no importance whatsoever for the tertium comparationis. 
Thinking that one could possibly take the singularity of ancient Greek (or any 
other) rhetoric as a tertium comparationis for a comparative approach is un-
founded. If the tertium comparationis is not considered a transcendental notion, 
but adopted from some empirical case, then it has to be an abstraction of the 
singularity of that case that like a concept can be predicated over the many, at 
least in the sort of relatability mentioned above (which, again, is precisely what 
is rejected by the claim of singularity). Perhaps it is useful to conceptualize the 
abstraction on a scale running from maximal particularity (bordering on singu-
larity) to the highest of generality, where both ends of the scale appear “singu-
larly” unattractive for the purposes of comparison. Both maximal particularity 
and maximal generality would pre-empt the result of the comparison, since with 
the former only differences and with the latter only commonalities could possibly 
arise. In this respect, comparison comes down to choosing an appropriate level of 
abstraction, i.e. of particularity or generality. What exact level of abstraction is 
chosen in a case at hand has myriad implications. 
Say, the understanding of rhetoric to be used in a study of rhetoric in early 
China is adopted from the empirical case of Greco-Roman rhetoric. Often, what 
happens is that someone proposes and puts up for discussion an understanding 
of rhetoric at a certain level of abstraction only to be countered by someone else 
insisting (in all validity and with good evidence) that actually, more precisely, or 
as a matter of fact, in the Greco-Roman case rhetoric was understood to be so and 
so. One way of understanding the second discussant is to take him or her as pit-
ting the singularity of the case against the generality of the proposed understand-
ing of rhetoric. This sort of objection is, as I have tried to persuade the reader in 
these pages, unfounded and possibly the result of a confusion of what compari-
son is and should be about. Another way of understanding the second discussant 
is to take him or her as proposing a more particular level of abstraction. This sort 
of objection is more reasonable and productive, but it is important to understand 
that the objection is not against what Greco-Roman rhetoric was really like, but 
against a level of abstraction considered for whatever reason inappropriate. It is, 
by the way, easily comprehensible that specialists, given their expertise and 
knowledge of as much detail as possible, should tend towards more particularity 
and find it difficult to accept generalization. Yet, if the discussion is about an un-
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derstanding of rhetoric for comparative purposes, then generalization is all it is 
about. 
The implication of having to choose a level of abstraction cannot be overesti-
mated. The level of abstraction chosen anticipates to no minor extent the results 
of the comparison and crucially qualifies how the results have to be understood. 
There seems to be a direct relation pertaining between the level of abstraction 
and the result of a comparison in terms of commonalities and differences (or sim-
ilarities and dissimilarities). Any move on the scale of abstraction towards more 
generality should produce more commonality and less difference, as any move in 
the opposite direction, towards more particularity, should end up showing more 
difference and less commonality. These mechanisms and the relations between 
the levels of abstraction chosen for a tertium comparationis and the outcome of a 
comparison deserve more attention and critical study. An important preliminary 
observation concerns the qualification of the results of a comparison as being 
necessarily contingent insofar as any set of commonalities and differences that 
come out of the comparison are directly related to the chosen level of abstraction. 
Because of this contingency, the entire comparative exercise might appear some-
what futile or similar to analysis (in that one does not know more after the analy-
sis than before, but perhaps only more clearly), were it not for the fact that com-
parison is an inquiry that transforms the pre-comparative tertium and quite 
naturally brings up new tertia comparationis.10 Comparison as inquiry is a 
powerful tool, but much of its power is lost, when resulting commonalities and 
differences are not understood as fundamentally relational notions, i.e. funda-
mentally related to the level of abstractness that the comparing person chooses to 
adopt. Despite all of that contingency, comparison can produce surprising results 
as when a low level of abstraction (high particularity) leads to significant com-
monalities or a very high level of abstraction (high generality) still brings out 
differences. 
In conclusion, let me briefly illustrate these points by returning to the state-
ment quoted above from the New Pauly: “It is true that some forms of rhetoric can 
also be found outside European culture, but they tend not to achieve the same 
10 John Stuart Mill emphasized a similar point against William Whewell: “It is not (as Mr. 
Whewell seems to suppose,) a law of our intellect, that in comparing things with each other and 
taking note of their agreement we merely recognise as realized in the outward world something 
that we already had in our minds. The conception originally found its way to us as the result of 
such a comparison. It was obtained (in metaphysical phrase,) by abstraction from individual 
things. These things may be things which we perceived or thought of on former occasions, but 
they may also be the things which we are perceiving or thinking on the very occasion” [emphasis 
in the original]. See Mill 2011, 2: 214.
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degree of elaboration that is a hallmark of Greco-Roman antiquity.” The state-
ment reads like the result of a comparison, in which the comparata are easily 
identified as “Greco-Roman antiquity” (and, by implication and most revealingly, 
“European culture”) on the one and that what is “outside European culture” on 
the other side. The tertium comparationis is rhetoric, which is understood as 
something that can come in different “forms” and in various “degree[s] of elabo-
ration”. The outcome of the comparison is an apparently clearly articulated differ-
ence: “the same degree of elaboration [of rhetoric] that is a hallmark of Greco- 
Roman antiquity” is absent “outside European culture”. I take it that the “same 
degree of elaboration” seeks to emphasize elaboration as meaning high elabora-
tion or a high degree thereof, for if it meant exactly the degree of elaboration, it 
would imply a claim of singularity and be merely stating the obvious. All hinges 
on how the high elaboration of rhetoric is conceptualized and how much it is 
abstracted from the asserted singularity of “Greco-Roman antiquity”. As far as I 
can see, the statement gives us no clue in this regard. In the absence of any indi-
cation of the level of abstraction, let alone any clue, we are almost completely at 
a loss as to how to estimate the value of the asserted difference. The difference, no 
doubt, says something and perhaps something important about the comparata as 
well as the person comparing. But it has its full meaning only if viewed in relation 
to the chosen level of abstraction, and depending on the particularity or general-
ity of that level, the result of the comparison might come as more or less of a sur-
prise or confirm what was to be expected.
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